| Linda R. S. v. Richard D. | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Supreme Court of the United States |
||||||
| Argued December 6, 1972 Decided March 5, 1973 |
||||||
| Full case name | Linda R.S. v. Richard D. Et al. | |||||
| Citations | 410 U.S. 614 (more) 410 U.S. 614 |
|||||
| Holding | ||||||
| Although appellant has an interest in her child's support, application of Art. 602 would not result in support but only in the father's incarceration, and a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
|
||||||
| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Marshall, joined by Burger, Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist | |||||
| Dissent | White, joined by Douglas | |||||
| Dissent | Blackmun, joined by Brennan | |||||
| Laws applied | ||||||
| Art. 602 of the Texas Penal Code | ||||||
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case resulting in a ruling that a particular section of a Texas Penal Code did not apply to mothers with illegitimate children. The case was argued on December 6, 1972 and decided on March 5, 1973. Linda R. S., the petitioner and appellant, was the mother of the illegitimate child. Richard D., the respondent and appellee, was the father of the illegitimate child.
Contents |
Linda R. S., the mother of an illegitimate child, brought an action to enjoin the "discriminatory application" of Art. 602 of the Texas Penal Code providing that any "parent" who fails to support his "children" is subject to prosecution, but which by state judicial construction applies only to married parents. Linda R. S. sought to enjoin the local district attorney from refraining to prosecute the father of her child for not providing child support. The three-judge District Court dismissed the action for lack of standing.
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's holding in a 5-4 decision. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Potter Stewart, and William Rehnquist. The Court held that "although appellant has an interest in her child's support, application of Art. 602 would not result in support but only in the father's incarceration, and a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another."[1]
Justice White, with Justice Douglas joining, wrote that "children born out of wedlock ... have been excluded intentionally from the class of persons protected by a particular criminal law. They do not get the protection of the laws that other women and children get. Under Art. 602, they are rendered nonpersons; a father may ignore them with full knowledge that he will be subjected to no penal sanctions."[2]
Justice Blackmun, with Justice Brennan joining, saw "no reason to decide that question in the absence of a live, ongoing controversy because of Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973)."[3]